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Can Laplace’s formula model a 
deterministic universe that is 
irreducibly probabilistic? 
Bhupinder Singh Anand 
 
(This paper includes, and extends, the concepts introduced in “Is a deterministic universe logically 
consistent with an irreducibly probabilistic Quantum Theory?”) 
If we assume the Thesis that any classical Turing machine T, which halts on 
every n-ary sequence of natural numbers as input in a determinate time t(n), 
determines a PA-provable formula, whose standard interpretation is an n-ary 
arithmetical relation f(x1,  ..., xn) that holds if, and only if, T halts, then we can 
define Laplace’s formula recursively such that it can express the state of a 
deterministic quantum universe which is irreducibly probabilistic.  
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1. Introduction 
Are our current theories of physics consistent with the concept of a universe that is 
completely deterministic, yet not pre-destined? 
In other words, can the initial conditions and all physical laws at any instant, say, for 
instance, at the time of a projected Big Bang, be knowable completely in a manner that is 
consistent with our current theories of physics? 
1.1 Is our universe pre-destined? 
As Ian Stewart remarks ([St97], p6), the pre-quantum, classical concept was that our 
universe is both deterministic and pre-destined, a view expressed “eloquently” by Pierre 
Simon de Laplace, one of the leading mathematicians of the 18th century, in his 
“Philosophical Essays on Probabilities”: 
An intellect1 which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature and 
the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this intellect were vast enough to 
submit its data to analysis, could condense into a single formula2 the movement of the 
                                                        
1 For convenience, we shall refer to such an intellect as Laplace’s intellect “Li”, pronounced “Lee”. 
 
2 For convenience, we shall refer to such a formula as Laplace’s formula “Lf”, pronounced “Elf”. 
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greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom: for such an intellect 
nothing could be uncertain; and the future just like the past would be present before its 
eyes. 
Such a notion of a pre-destined universe evolved as “the revolution in scientific thought 
that culminated in Newton led to a vision of the universe as some gigantic mechanism ... 
In such a vision, a machine is above all predictable” ([St97], p6). 
1.2 Is our universe deterministic? 
As Stewart observes further ([St97], p329), the post-quantum belief that our universe 
may be deterministic in a yet unknown, but fundamental, way (which may not necessarily 
be pre-destined) is reflected in Einstein’s well-known remark, in the following excerpt 
from a letter to Max Born: 
You believe in the God who plays dice, and I in complete law and order in a world 
which objectively exists, and which I, in a wildly speculative way, am trying to capture. 
I firmly believe, but I hope that someone will discover a more realistic way, or rather a 
more tangible basis than it has been my lot to do. Even the great initial success of the 
quantum theory does not make me believe in the fundamental dice game ... . 
1.3 Is quantum mechanics ‘irreducibly probabilistic”? 
Stewart notes, further ([St97], p330), the prevalent view that, despite Einstein’s 
predilections, the universe, or at least our present quantum mechanical description of it, 
is of an “irreducibly probabilistic character”. He then suggests that we may need to 
seriously consider the “... possibility of changing the theoretical framework of physics 
altogether, replacing quantum uncertainty by deterministic chaos, as Einstein would have 
liked”.  
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1.4 Can we mathematically express a deterministic, yet quantum, universe that is 
not pre-destined? 
Clearly, the extent to which we can address this issue meaningfully will depend on how 
precisely we can express the above concept, of a deterministic, yet quantum, universe 
that is not pre-destined, within a constructive3, and intuitionistically unobjectionable 
language.  
In this paper, we broadly address the above issue of whether such expression can be 
made mathematically for a Big Bang type of universe U that, we assume, creates at most 
denumerable particles at the instant of creation, all super-posed upon each other at a 
single “point”, where the states, and inter-actions, of the particles are dynamic and follow 
deterministic laws, and where the future can reasonably be interpreted as irreducibly 
probabilistic. 
Specifically, we consider the following: 
(i) Can we constructively define intuitive concepts such as “particle”, “deterministic”, 
“quantum”, “knowable”, “pre-destined”, and, most significantly, “Laplace’s 
formula” mathematically? 
(ii) Is there a mathematical description of the state of a given particle P at a given 
inter-action4 t, such that, given any property x of P, there is always an effective 
method by which we can determine the value y of the property x uniquely? 
                                                        
3 We term a mathematical language constructive if, and only if, there is an effective method of assigning 
truth-values to the propositions of the language (cf. [An02c], §5). 
 
4 The term “inter-action”, as used here, and henceforth, should be taken to correspond intuitively to the 
term “instant”. However, such instants are only those discrete moments of time when the particle “inter-
acts” with some other particle in the universe. This presumes that the particle’s inter-action with the 
universe is not continuous, and so the state, or signature, of the particle is known only as, and changes 
only as, a result of an inter-action.  
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(iii) Can such a description allow for the possibility that, given any arbitrary set of 
properties of a given particle P, there is no effective method such that we can 
always determine the precise values of the given properties simultaneously at any 
inter-action t? 
(iv) Can such a description allow for the possibility that the sequence of values of 
some property x of a given particle P, measured at discrete inter-actions t1, t2, ..., 
may be Li-unpredictable? 
Preliminary Definition 1: A class of natural numbers is Li-predictable if, and 
only if, it is a well-defined mathematical object5 (such as, for instance, any well-
defined set determined by a consistent set theory6). We assume that, in this case, 
Li is aware of any member of the class directly, without depending on any 
effective method for computing it.  
Preliminary Definition 2: A sequence of natural numbers is Li-unpredictable if, 
and only if, it does not define a mathematical object. We assume that, in this 
case, Li is not aware of the value of the i’th term directly for any given i, but 
must depend on an effective method for computing it. 
(v) Can we assume that fundamental particles have a distinct identity throughout their 
“lifetime” in such a description? 
                                                        
5 The formal definition of a mathematical object is given in Anand ([An02c], §1.2, Definition 1(iii)). 
 
6 We note that, since there are recursive number-theoretic relations and functions that cannot be 
introduced through definition into any formal system of Arithmetic without inviting inconsistency 
([An02c], Corollary 1.1), such a theory cannot contain a standard Axiom Schema of Separation 
(Comprehension) such as:  
 
Suppose X is a set and f  is a formula then {x is in X: f (x)} is also a set. More formally, (Ax)(Ey)(z is 
in y <=> (z is in x and f (x)).  
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(vi) Can two distinctly different particles “occupy” the same space simultaneously in 
such a description? 
1.5 Quantum concepts in a constructive framework of recursive functions and 
Peano’s Arithmetic 
The underlying thesis of this paper is that a constructive, non-classical, mathematical 
language for quantum mechanical descriptions, which addresses these questions 
appropriately, can, indeed, be built around asymmetric ([An02c], §2.1] recursive 
number-theoretic relations. These relations, characteristically, are not the standard 
interpretations of any of their formal representations in any standard first order 
Arithmetic that is based on Dedekind’s formulation of the Peano Axioms for the natural 
numbers [An02c].  
1.6 A possible ambiguity in classical Turing computability 
However, in order to address these questions appropriately, we argue that there is a need 
to make the concept of classical Turing-computability7 less ambiguous. This ambiguity is 
highlighted when we consider the two meta-theses: 
(a)  Classical Halting Thesis: Every PA-formula8, that is a true9 n-ary arithmetical10 
relation f(x1,  ..., xn) under the standard interpretation11, determines a classical 
                                                        
7 We follow Mendelson’s definition of a classical Turing machine ([Me64], p229), and of classical 
Turing-computability ([Me64], p231).  
 
8 By “PA”, we mean a classical, standard, first order formal system of Arithmetic such as Mendelson’s 
formal system S ([Me64], p102). We note, however, that the arguments of this paper would also hold for 
Gödel’s formal system P ([Go31a], p9).  
 
In the definitions of logical terms, we generally follow Mendelson’s definitions [Me64] such as, for 
instance: 
 
(i)  A formula of a formal system S is any finite sequence of the alphabet (assumed to consist of a 
countable set of symbols) of S ([Me64], p29).  
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Turing machine T that halts on every n-ary sequence k1,  ..., kn of natural numbers 
as input if, and only if, f(k1,  ..., kn) holds.  
(b)  Quantum Halting Thesis: Any classical Turing machine T that halts on every n-
ary sequence of natural numbers as input in a determinate time t(n) determines a 
PA-provable formula, whose standard interpretation is an n-ary arithmetical 
relation f(x1,  ..., xn) such that, for any sequence k1,  ..., kn of natural numbers, 
f(k1,  ..., kn) holds if, and only if, T halts.  
Clearly, the two meta-theses are mutually inconsistent, since (a) would determine a 
classical Turing machine T that halts on every n-ary sequence k1,  ..., kn of natural 
numbers as input even for a PA-unprovable formula that is a true n-ary arithmetical 
relation f(x1,  ..., xn) under the standard interpretation12.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
(ii) A well-formed formulas of S is any one of a specially selected sub-set of the formulas of S, where the 
selection is such that, given any formula F, there is always an effective method to decide whether F is a 
well-formed formula of S or not ([Me64], p29).  
 
(iii) A formula of S is S-provable if, and only if, there is a finite proof sequence of S-formulas each of 
which is either an axiom of S, or an immediate consequence of two of the preceding formulas in the 
sequence by the rules of inference of S ([Me64], p29). 
 
9 We follow Tarski’s definitions of the “satisfiability” and “truth” of a formula under a given 
interpretation ([Me64], p49-53).  
 
We note that Tarski’s definitions implicitly assume that a formula [F] is true under an interpretation if, 
and only if, there is an effective method (native to the interpretation) for determining that the formula 
[F] is satisfied under the interpretation for all sequences in the domain of the interpretation ([An02c], 
§II(5.1)). It follows by Church’s Thesis ([Me64], p147, footnote), that, if the PA-formula [F] is true 
under the standard interpretation, then it is recursive. 
 
10 We follow Mendelson’s definition of an arithmetical relation (predicate) ([Me64], p135, Ex. 2a). We 
note that, in standard PA, this definition is equivalent to Gödel’s definition of arithmetical relations 
([Go31a], p29). 
 
11 We follow Mendelson’s definitions of interpretation ([Me64], p49) and standard interpretation 
([Me64], p107). 
 
12 In his classic 1931 paper [Go31a], Gödel constructs such a formula in an intuitionistically 
unobjectionable manner.  
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Further, since the conclusion in (a), and the premise in (b), are not effectively verifiable, 
the two meta-theses are essentially undecidable. Prima facie, we thus have two, 
apparently equally sound, but essentially different, systems of Arithmetic based on 
constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable13, interpretations of standard PA; 
reasonably, they should have significantly different consequences.  
1.7 Three theorems 
We argue that this is, indeed, so, in the following: 
Theorem 1: The principle of Quantum Uncertainty is inconsistent with the Classical 
Halting Thesis. 
Theorem 2: The principle of Quantum Uncertainty is logically consistent with the 
Quantum Halting Thesis. 
Theorem 3: The Quantum Halting Thesis implies that every partial recursive function 
can be effectively defined as a total14 function. 
2. Defining a deterministic universe 
We start by introducing the critical concept of a formally undecidable proposition, first 
constructed by Gödel in his seminal 1931 paper, as the basis for defining a mathematical 
function that, loosely speaking, corresponds to the classical quantum state of a particle.  
                                                        
13 We use the terms “constructive” and “intuitionistically unobjectionable” in the sense in which Gödel 
used them to describe his formal reasoning in his seminal 1931 paper [Go31a]. 
 
14 Loosely speaking, a number-theoretic function is total if, and only if, it is defined for every set of 
natural number values of its free variables. 
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Definition 1: The standard interpretation of a unary PA-formula is a quantum 
signature if, and only if, the formula is PA-unprovable but true under the standard 
interpretation. 
The significance of a quantum signature [F(x)]15 is that, given any natural number k, we 
can always construct an individually16 effective17 method for determining that F(k) holds, 
but there may be no uniformly effective method, even for Laplace’s intellect, such that, 
given any k, we can always determine that F(k) holds. 
Treating the terms “particle”, “property” and “value” as undefined primitives, we 
intuitively assert the: 
Expressibility Thesis: Any physical property of any given particle that can be 
measured by some effective method can be expressed by a finite string in a suitably 
defined, recursively enumerable, language18 L, which has a finite alphabet. Similarly, 
                                                        
15 We denote the PA-formula whose interpretation is F by [F]. 
 
16 The thesis underlying this paper is based on the argument that we can differentiate between intuitive 
concepts such as “individually decidable”, “individually computable”, “individually terminating routine” 
etc., and their corresponding, and contrasting, intuitive concepts such as “uniformly decidable”, 
“uniformly computable”, “uniformly terminating routine” etc. ([An02c], §II(5)).  
 
Loosely speaking, we would use the terminology, for instance “individually decidable”, if, and only if, 
say, a PA-formula with free variables is decidable individually, as satisfiable or not, in an interpretation 
M for any given instantiation. This corresponds to, but is not necessarily a consequence of, the case 
where every instantiation of the formula is PA-provable. We note that the closure of the formula may not 
be P-provable  
 
In contrast, we would use the terminology “uniformly decidable” if, and only if, a PA-formula with free 
variables is decidable jointly, as true or not, in the interpretation M as an infinitely compound assertion 
of all of its instantiations. This corresponds to, and is a consequence of, the case where the closure of the 
formula is PA-provable. 
 
The concept of an intuitively terminating routine may be taken as corresponding to the classical concept 
of an “effective procedure” ([Me64], p207). 
 
17 We broadly follow Mendelson’s approach to “effectiveness” ([Me64], p207). 
 
18 We define a language L as recursively enumerable if there exists a Turing machine that accepts every 
string of the language, and does not accept strings that are not in the language. 
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any value of such a physical property that can be determined by some effective method 
can also be expressed by a finite string in L. 
It immediately follows that: 
Lemma 1: Any property can be uniquely Gödel-numbered19 by a natural number, and 
any value of a property can, similarly, be uniquely Gödel-numbered by a natural 
number.  
We note that not every natural number need correspond to a property, and that not every 
natural number need correspond to the value of a property. We also note that, even if the 
number of all possible particles, properties and values in a deterministic universe U are 
not denumerable, since we can only express denumerable strings within L, in this paper 
we only consider the recursively enumerable set of properties for which we have an 
effective method of measurement. 
We next define: 
Definition 2: The signature of a given particle Pi at any inter-action t is a number-
theoretic relation p(i, t, x, y) that holds if, and only if, for any given property 
represented by x, there is a unique natural number y, where the domain of x is assumed 
to be a recursively enumerable set20 of the Gödel-numbers of all the properties that are 
expressible in L21, and the domain of y is assumed to be a recursively enumerable set of 
the Gödel-numbers of all values that are expressible in L. 
                                                        
19 By “Gödel-numbered”, we mean the assignment of a unique natural number to the formal expression 
of any concept within a language ([Me64], p135). 
 
20 “A set of natural numbers is called recursively enumerable (r.e) if, and only if, it is either empty or is 
the range of a recursive function. Intuitively, if we accept Church’s Thesis, then a recursively 
enumerable set is a collection of natural numbers which is generated by some mechanical process.” 
([Me64], p250) 
 
21 Prima facie, it is not obvious whether the properties need to be mutually independent, where we define 
a set of properties as mutually independent if, and only if, any property in the set can assume any 
 11
We can now define: 
Definition 3: The history Hi, t of any given particle Pi22 at any specified inter-action t23 
is the set of particle signatures {p(i, s, x, y): 0 =< s =< t-1}. 
Definition 4: For any given particle Pi, we define a given property24 k as deterministic 
if, at any given inter-action t, there is an effective method25 to determine a unique value 
mk, t such that p(i, t, k, mk, t) holds.  
Definition 5: A given universe U is deterministic if, for any given particle Pi, any given 
property k, and any given inter-action t, there is an effective method to determine a 
unique value mk, t such that p(i, t, k, mk, t) holds.  
We now note that: 
                                                                                                                                                                   
permitted values in its range without affecting the values of any other property in the set. Formally, if 
the properties are denoted by k1, k2, ..., and the permitted range of values of the property denoted by ki is 
Ri, then the set of properties is mutually independent if, and only if, every permissible sequence of 
values, denoted by m1, m2, ..., where mi is in Ri, is a valid set of values for the set of properties denoted 
by k1, k2, .... 
 
22 Although we cannot assume that a given history necessarily defines a unique particle, for the moment, 
it is convenient, loosely speaking, to view the particle P as a Platonic mathematical entity with a unique 
identity. An entity, moreover, that manifests itself only through its history - in other words, through its 
set of signatures at its various inter-actions during its lifetime.  
 
23 We note that t here is a natural number that is assumed to be the t’th inter-action of the particle Pi, 
with some other particle in the universe, with reference to an initial signature p(i, 0, x, y). In other 
words, we assume that, for any property k, the values p(i, 0, k, mk 0), p(i, 1, k, mk, 1), ..., p(i, t-1, k, mk, t-
1) are already known. 
 
24 Where there is no obvious ambiguity, we shall henceforth use the terms “property k” and “value mk, t” 
when we actually mean “property whose Gödel-number is k”, and “value whose Gödel-number is mk, t at 
inter-action t”.  
 
25 We note that the concept of an “effective method” is essentially intuitive, and, loosely speaking, may 
be taken as corresponding to the result of some experiment that is based on assuming deterministic, 
fundamental, Laws of Nature in the classical, Newtonian, sense as, apparently, intended by Einstein in 
his above cited letter. 
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Lemma 2: If the properties expressible in L are recursively enumerable, and we 
assume Turing’s Thesis26, then we can effectively determine whether p(i, t, k, m) holds 
or not in a given deterministic universe U for any given natural numbers i, t, k, m.  
Proof: By definition, and the Turing Thesis, there is a classical Turing machine T 
such that, given any natural numbers i, t, k, m as input, T halts if, and only if, p(i, t, 
k, m) holds. If k is not the Gödel-number of a property, then p(i, t, k, m) is 
undefined, and we assume that, in such a case, T will loop on the input k.  
We note that the definition of any classical Turing machine T can be extended to 
allow for recording, in its infinite memory27, of every instantaneous tape 
description28 during the operation of a classical Turing machine. 
Now, T can always be meta-programmed to compare its current instantaneous tape 
description with the finite set of previous instantaneous tape descriptions during its 
current operation, and to self-terminate if an instantaneous tape description repeats 
itself, i.e. at the onset of a loop29. We can, thus, use this condition to effectively 
define p(i, t, k, m) as holding vacuously if k is not the Gödel-number of a property.  
                                                        
26 We take Church’s Thesis to essentially state that a number-theoretic function is effectively computable 
if, and only if, it is recursive, and a partial number-theoretic function is effectively computable if, and 
only if, it is partial recursive ([Me64], p227). We note too, that a number-theoretic function is Turing-
computable if, and only if, it is partial recursive ([Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13 & p237, Corollary 5.15). 
We thus have the Turing Thesis [Tu36] that a number-theoretic function is effectively computable if, 
and only if, it is Turing-computable. 
 
27 We may visualise T as a virtual teleprinter that copies, and records, every instantaneous tape 
description in an area of the machine that acts as a dynamic, random access, memory during any 
operation of T. 
 
28 Cf. Mendelson ([Me64], p230). 
 
29 Cf. Anand ([An02c], §II(7.1)). 
 
 13
Hence we can effectively determine whether p(i, t, k, m) holds or not for any given 
natural numbers i, t, k, m.¶30 
We thus have: 
Lemma 3: If we assume the Church Thesis, then the number-theoretic relation p(i, t, 
x, y), describing the signature of the particle Pi at inter-action t, is recursive31 in a 
given deterministic universe U. 
Proof: This follows from the argument that every Turing-computable function f is 
recursive if it is total32. 
We note that, in view of Lemma 3, the particle signature p(i, t, x, y) is essentially 
Laplace’s formula for a given deterministic universe U, since it essentially condenses 
“into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the 
lightest atom”, and “all the forces that animate Nature and the mutual positions of the 
beings that comprise it”. 
We also note that the particle signature p(i, t, x, y), at any inter-action t in a given 
deterministic universe U, can be viewed as a point in an infinite dimensional Hilbert 
space, whose co-ordinates are (mt, 1, mt, 2, ...), where mt, k is the value along the k axis 
that satisfies p(i, t, k, mt, k). We can thus define: 
Definition 6: A Gödelian point gi(t) of the particle Pi is a point in an infinite 
dimensional Hilbert space, whose co-ordinates are (mt, 1, mt, 2, ...), where mt, k is the 
value along the k axis that satisfies p(i, t, k, mt, k). 
                                                        
30 We can thus treat the particle signature pt(x, y) at any inter-action t as a point in an infinite 
dimensional Hilbert space, whose co-ordinates are m1, m2, ..., where mk is the value of the property k.. 
 
31 We follow Mendelson’s ([Me64], p120) definitions of recursive functions and relations. 
 
32 Cf. Mendelson ([Me64], p233, Corollary 5.13). 
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Definition 7: The Gödelian world-line33 G(i) of the particle Pi is the non-terminating 
sequence of particle signatures p(i, 0, x, y), p(i, 1, x, y) ... in a given deterministic 
universe U. 
Definition 8: A Gödelian world-line is a fundamental particle Pi in a given 
deterministic universe U if, and only if, the non-terminating sequence of the Gödelian 
points, gi(t), t >= 0, is a well-defined mathematical entity. 
2.1 Defining a quantum universe 
We next define: 
Definition 9: The PA-formula [Qt(x, y)], which expresses34 the recursive relation pi(t, 
x, y) in PA, is a quantum signature if, and only if, the formula [(E!y)Qt(x, y)]35 is PA-
unprovable, but true under the standard interpretation of PA.  
We note that, by definition, if the PA-formula [Qt(x, y)] expresses the recursive relation 
pt(x, y), then, for any given any natural numbers k, m: 
(i) (E!y)Qt(k, y) holds, and  
(ii) Qt(k, m) holds if, and only if, pt(k, m) holds. 
We can now define: 
                                                        
33 A Gödelian world-line is thus a step function in a Hilbert-space ([Pe90], p332; [Ru53], p229), p219). 
Treating this as defining a unique particle would correspond, loosely speaking, to the classical 
relativistic representation of a particle as a continuous world-line in Minkowski space-time ([Pe90], 
p250). 
 
34 We follow Mendelson’s ([Me64], p117-8) definitions of expressibility and representability of number-
theoretic functions. 
 
35 The notation “(E!x)” denotes uniqueness. 
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Definition 10: A Gödelian world-line is quantum if the PA-representation of its 
signature at every inter-action is a quantum signature. 
Definition 11: A deterministic universe is pre-destined if it does not contain any 
quantum Gödelian world-line. 
Definition 12: A deterministic universe is partially pre-destined if, and only if, it is not 
pre-destined. 
Definition 13: A partially pre-destined universe is quantum if, and only if, it contains 
only quantum Gödelian world-lines. 
Lemma 4: A quantum universe Q contains no fundamental particles. 
3. The Classical Halting Thesis in a quantum universe 
We now have that: 
Lemma 5: If we assume the Classical Halting Thesis (a) in a deterministic universe, 
then, for any given particle P, there is a classical Turing machine T such that, for any 
input k, T will halt and return the value m if, and only if, pt(k, m) holds. 
Proof: T will halt on input k if, and only if, (E!y)Qt(k, y) holds. By our hypothesis, 
for any given k, (E!y)Qt(k, y) holds uniquely for some value m. Hence, for given 
input k, T must run a sub-routine that will halt on, and can be programmed to 
return, m.¶ 
This would clearly imply that: 
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Lemma 6: If we assume the Classical Halting Thesis (a), then there is some effective 
method that can completely determine the values of any finite number of, arbitrarily 
selected, properties simultaneously for any given particle in a deterministic universe.  
We define: 
Definition 14: The principle of Quantum Uncertainty holds in a universe if, and only if, 
there are properties of some particles whose values cannot be completely determined 
simultaneously. 
It follows that: 
Theorem 1: The principle of Quantum Uncertainty is inconsistent with the Classical 
Halting Thesis. 
4. The Quantum Halting Thesis in a quantum universe 
However, in a quantum universe, the formula [(E!y)Qt(x, y)] is not PA-provable for any 
given particle. It follows that: 
Lemma 7: If we assume the Quantum Halting Thesis (b) in a deterministic universe, 
then, for any given particle P, there is no classical Turing machine T such that, for any 
given input k, T will halt and return the value m if, and only if, pt(k, m) holds. 
This, now, clearly implies that: 
Lemma 8: There is no effective method that can always determine the values of a finite 
number of, arbitrarily selected, properties of any given particle P simultaneously, even 
though, by our premise, given any property k, there is always some effective method 
that will completely determine its value mk at inter-action t. 
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We thus conclude that: 
Theorem 2: The principle of Quantum Uncertainty is consistent with the Quantum 
Halting Thesis36. 
5. Some consequences 
We note that t in Definition 2 is a natural number that is assumed to be the t’th inter-
action of the particle P with some other particle in the universe, necessarily with 
reference to some initial signature p0(k, mk, 0)37. In other words, we assume that, for any 
given particle P and any given property k, the signature p0(k, mk, 0), p1(k, mk, 1), ..., pt-
1(k, mk, t-1), ... is assumed known to Laplace’s deity. 
5.1 The Gödel ß-function 
We note further that, for any given property k and inter-action t = tn, we can define a 
recursive Gödel ß-function38 qP, k(b, c, i), such that qP, k(b, c, i) = mk, i for all 0 =< i =< 
                                                        
36 Intuitively, the Quantum Halting Thesis can be viewed as “irreducibly probabilistic” if we interpret 
the probabilities of Quantum Theory as describing, not any essential property pertaining to the physical 
state of a particle, but the probability that any relation pt(x, y) that is satisfied by any experiment, or 
finite series of experiments, represents the complete physical state of the particle at the inter-action t. 
 
37 This would, essentially, be the initial signature of the particle at, say, an instant such as a projected 
Big Bang. 
 
38 We follow Mendelson’s exposition ([Me64], p131) of the Gödel ß-function.  
 
Loosely speaking, Gödel’s Beta-function ß(x1, x2, i) may be taken to represent a given finite sequence 
([Go31a], p31, lemma1). Formally, for any given sequence f(1), f(2), ..., f(n), we can always construct 
some x1 and x2 such that, for all i<n, ß(x1, x2, i) = f(i). We note, however, that the denumerable 
sequences f(1), f(2), ... , f(n), mk (where k>0 and mk is not equal to ml if k is not equal to l), are 
represented by denumerable, distinctly different, Beta-functions ß(xk,1, xk,2, i) respectively. There are 
thus denumerable pairs xk,1, xk,2 for which ß(xk,1, xk,2, i) represents any given sequence f(1), f(2), ... , 
f(n). 
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n39, where mk, i is the value of the property k at the inter-action ti, and b, c are natural 
numbers that can be constructively determined by the sequence mk, 0, mk , 1, ..., mk, n. 
5.2 Properties with random values in a deterministic universe 
If we assume that the inter-actions t0, t1, ..., tn refer to the series of inter-actions that 
occur during a particles lifetime40, then we may reasonably define: 
Definition 15: A property k is predictable if the sequence of values represented by the 
sequence mk, 0, mk , 1, ..., mk, n, as the number n of inter-actions increases indefinitely, is 
a Cauchy sequence; otherwise k is random. 
Prima facie, it thus follows that: 
Lemma 9: Both predictable and random properties are consistent with a deterministic 
universe.  
5.3 Probability of an inter-action yielding a given value 
We note, further, that, for any given sequence mk, 0, mk , 1, ..., mk, n, there are 
denumerable pairs of natural numbers (b, c) that define Gödel ß-functions relative to the 
sequence; however, although the functions will all yield identical values of mk, i for 0 =< 
i =< n, each of them will yield different sequences mk, n+1, mk, n+2, ....  
The challenge of any theory, thus, would be to determine, firstly, which of these 
functions are such that all the terms of the non-terminating sequence are Gödel-numbers 
of values of the property k; secondly, the probability that the result mk, n+1 of the inter-
action tn+1, for any pair (b, c), will represent any given value of the property k. 
                                                        
39 A notation such as “=<” is to be read naturally as “equal to or less than”. 
 
40 Since, say, the Big Bang. 
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We thus have that: 
Lemma 10: A sufficient condition for a deterministic universe to be pre-destined is 
that every property of every particle P have a characteristic Gödel ß-function that 
determines the value of the property at any inter-action tn for all n >= 0. 
Lemma 11: A necessary condition for a deterministic universe to be pre-destined is 
that the initial signature p0(k0, m0), p0(k1, m1), ..., p0(kt-1, mt-1), ... of every particle P 
is assumed known. 
If we now define: 
Definition 16: A universe is predictable if there is always an effective method such 
that, for any given particle P, any given deterministic property k, and any given inter-
action t, we can determine a unique value mk such that pt(k, mk) holds.  
We then have that: 
Lemma 12: A sufficient condition for a deterministic universe to be unpredictable is 
that the initial signature p0(k0, m0), p0(k1, m1), ..., p0(kt-1, mt-1), ... of every particle P 
is assumed unknowable. 
5.4 Superposition 
We also note that, if qP, k(b, c, i) = mk, i for all 0 =< i =< n, where mk, i is the value of 
the property k at the inter-action ti, and q'P, k(b', c', i) = m'k, i for all 0 =< i =< n', where 
m'k, i is the value of the property k at the inter-action t'i, we can always combine the two 
sequences of inter-actions mk, 0, mk, 1, ..., mk, n, and m'k, 0, m'k, 1, ..., m'k, n', 
appropriately41 to yield a sequence m"k, 0, m"k, 1, ..., m"k, n'', where n'' = n + n'.  
                                                        
41 We assume that there is an effective way of ensuring that the combined sequence t''i, 0 =< i =< n'', is 
also chronological.  
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We thus have a Gödel ß-function q''P, k(b'', c'', i) = m''k, i for all 0 =< i =< n'', where 
m''i is the value of the property k at the inter-action t''i, which may be considered as the 
superposition of the Gödel ß-function q'P, k(b', c', i) on qP, k(b, c, i). 
It follows that: 
Lemma 13: The probability42 that q''P, k(b'', c'', n''+1) = m for a given m is always 
equal to, or greater than, the probability that qP, k(b, c, n+1) = m. 
Proof: The sequence m0, m1, ..., mn is a proper sub-sequence of m''0, m''1, ..., 
m''n''. Hence, if q''P, k(b'', c'', n''+1) = m, then there is always some pair (b, c) such 
that qP, k(b, c, n''+1) = m. The converse is not true.  
Hence the set of Gödel ß-functions for which q''P, k(b'', c'', i) = m''i for all 0 =< i 
=< n'', where m''i is the value of the property k at the inter-action t''i, is a proper 
sub-set of the set of Gödel ß-functions for which qP, k(b, c, i) = mi for all 0 =< i =< 
n, where mi is the value of the property k at the inter-action ti.¶ 
Appendix 1: Defining every partial recursive function as total 
The above consequences emerged incidentally out of the following, prima facie 
unrelated, argument, which effectively defines every partial recursive function as total. 
Theorem 3: The Quantum Halting Thesis implies that every partial recursive43 number-
theoretic function f(x1, ..., xn) is constructively definable as a total function. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
42 We assume here that this probability is, in a sense, “proportional” to the cardinality of the concerned 
set of Gödel ß-functions. 
 
43 Classically ([Me64], p120-1, 214), a partial function f of n arguments is called partial recursive if, and 
only if, f can be obtained from the initial functions (zero function), projection functions, and successor 
function (of classical recursive function theory) by means of substitution, recursion and the classical, 
unrestricted, µ-operator. f is said to come from g by means of the unrestricted µ-operator, where g(x1, ..., 
xn, y) is recursive, if, and only if, f(x1, ..., xn) = µy(g(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0), where µy(g(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0) is 
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Proof: We assume that f is obtained from the recursive function g by means of the 
unrestricted µ-operator, so that f(x1, ..., xn) = µy(g(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0). 
Given any sequence k1, ..., kn of natural numbers, we can then define: 
(i) a classical Turing machine T1 that will halt if, and only if, (g(k1, ..., kn, k) = 
0) holds for some natural number k; 
(ii) a classical Turing machine T2 that will halt if, and only if, ~(g(k1, ..., kn, k) = 
0) holds for some natural number k; 
(iii) a classical Turing machine T344 that will halt if, and only if, [H(k1, ..., kn, y)] 
is PA-provable, where [H(x1, ..., xn, y)] is the PA-formula that represents 
(g(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0) in PA. 
If we now assume the Quantum Halting Thesis, it follows that: 
(a) if T1 halts, without looping, on all natural numbers, then [H(k1, ..., kn, y)] is 
PA-provable; 
(b) similarly, if T2 halts, without looping, on all natural numbers, then [H(k1, ..., 
kn, y)] is PA-provable. 
Hence, if (g(k1, ..., kn, y) = 0) holds for all natural numbers y, then: 
(c) either [H(k1, ..., kn, y)] is PA-provable, and T3 will halt;  
                                                                                                                                                                   
the least number k (if such exists) such that, if 0=<i=<k, g(x1, ..., xn, i) exists and is not 0, and g(x1, ..., 
xn, k) = 0. We note that, classically, f may not be defined for certain n-tuples; in particular, for those n-
tuples (x1, ..., xn) for which there is no y such that g(x1, ..., xn, y) = 0.  
 
44 The definition of T3 is based on Gödel’s recursive number-theoretic relation xBy ([Go31a], Definition 
45), which holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a PA-proof of the PA-formula whose Gödel-
number is y. 
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(d) or, if [H(k1, ..., kn, y)] is not PA-provable, then T2 will loop, and self-
terminate, for some natural number k. 
If we now run T1, T2 and T3 simultaneously, then we are assured that at least one 
of them will halt, or self-terminate, for some natural number k. We can thus use the 
condition indicated by the halting, or self-terminating, state to effectively define the 
partial recursive function f(x1, ..., xn) appropriately as a total partial recursive 
function.¶ 
Appendix 2: Collapse of the wave function 
Consider this: 
(i) Gödel has proved that there is an arithmetic formula [G(x)] such that, for any 
given k, [G(k)] is provable.  
(ii) Hence, for any given k, there is always some effective method for evaluating the 
arithmetic expression G(k). 
(iii) Gödel has also proved that [(Ax)G(x)] is not provable. 
(iv) Thesis: There is no uniform effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) that 
can evaluate the arithmetic expression G(x) for any given x. 
(v) Thus, G(n) is individually computable, but not uniformly computable. 
(vi) Theorem (provable by induction) : For any given k, we can always find some 
effective method (algorithm/Turing machine) T(k) that can compute G(n) for all 
n<k, i.e. T(k) terminates for all n<k, but it "loops" on input k. (Note: All methods 
that evaluate G(n) for all n<k cannot be non-terminating on input k; this would imply 
that G(k) is undefined, which contradicts (ii).) 
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(vii) Quantum interpretation: The process of finding T(k+1) can be corresponded, 
firstly, to the act of finding a suitable method of measuring the value G(k) precisely, 
and, secondly, to the collapse of the wave function at k as a result of the 
measurement; we then have the new "state" T(k'), which can evaluate the value of 
G(n) for all n<k', where k<k', but not beyond! 
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